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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WEST VALLEY CITY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 900273-CA
Category 16

DALE CHAPMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(d).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the lower court err in failing to suppress all evidence
relating to a charge of driving while under the influence of
alcohol because of an illegal traffic stop initially made by the
arresting officer?
(Utah App. 1989) .

Sandy City v. Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011
Whether the requisite reasonable suspicion was

present to support an investigatory detention by a police officer
presents a question of fact.
181, 183 (Utah 1987).

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d

The standard for review in such cases is

whether the denial of a motion to suppress was "clearly
erroneous".

State v. Ash, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).

A trial court's finding is clearly erroneous if it is without
adequate evidentiary support in the record or if it is induced by
-1-

an erroneous view of the law.

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d

191, 193 (Utah 1987); see also, State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah
Adv. Rpt. 13, 14 (1990) (a finding not supported by substantial
competent evidence is clearly erroneous).
APPLICABLE STATUTES
Amendment 4, United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Constitution, Section 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The record in this case is a confusing maze of procedural
irregularities which make it difficult for the parties and this
Court to properly comprehend.

It is unknown why the Third

Circuit Court of West Valley has failed in its obligation to
properly preserve the record in a coherent form but regardless
of the reasons the record must be dealt with in its present
condition.
On February 11, 1989 Defendant was issued a citation for
driving under the influence of alcohol.

On February 22 a not

guilty plea was entered by Defendant's attorney Larry Long.
4).

On March 7, 1989 a "per se" hearing was held in the
-2-

(R.

Department of Driver's License Division for the purpose of
determining whether Defendant would maintain his driver's
license.

A separate transcript of this hearing has been included

in the record on appeal,
A Motion to Suppress the evidence was filed by the defendant
and a hearing was scheduled for April 3, 1989.

(R. 7, 8-20).

A

memorandum dated April 19, 1989 in opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Suppress the evidence was filed by the City.

This

memorandum is contained in a separate envelope of the record and
is not numbered in the court file.
On April 25, 1989 Defendant objected to the Statement of
Facts contained in the memorandum and requested an evidentiary
hearing on the Motion to Suppress.

(R. 21-22).

hearing was scheduled for June 26, 1989.

An evidentiary

(R. 25). Upon the

request of the City a continuation of the hearing was granted and
the hearing was moved to July 10, 1989.

(R. 27). At the same

time a jury trial was set for August 23, 1989.
!*• is believed by Defendant that the evidentiary hearing was
held on July 10 although there is nothing in the file to indicate
what occurred at the suppression hearing with the exception of
some handwritten notes presumably by the court on a sheet of
paper.

(R.

27). A copy of this suppression hearing has been

transcribed by Defendant from the tape recording of the
proceeding.

A new memorandum was subsequently filed by the

defendant on July 21, 1989 (R.

30-35).

On August 23, 1989, the time set for trial, the Court
continued the trial until October 17, 1989.
-3-

(R. 43). On October

4, 1989 a motion was made by Defendant to continue the jury trial
on the grounds that no decision had yet been rendered as to
defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence. (R. 45). At the
same time a motion was made by Defendant for a second evidentiary
hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress and a request that the
Court render a decision on Defendant's Motion to Suppress and to
submit a written decision of the findings of fact and conclusions
of law.

(R. 48-49) .

On October 17, 1989 Defendant appeared before the lower
court and entered a conditional plea of guilty.

(R. 56-59).

A

separate transcript of that hearing made from the tape recording
has been filed with this Court.
A Notice of Appeal dated November 3, 1989, with a mailing
certificate of November 17, 1989 and a filing date of November
24, 1989 appeals from the October 17, 1989 judgment.
64-65).

(R.

The "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order" of

the lower court do not contain a filing date but are dated
November 29, 1989.

The Court basically denied Defendant's Motion

to Suppress on the basis that the totality of circumstances gave
the officer reasonable grounds to stop the defendant.

A copy of

these findings is included in the Appendix.
A second copy of Defendant's Notice of Appeal dated November
3, 1989 is contained in the file with a new filing date of
December 4, 1989.

(R. 71-72).

Despite repeated requests from Defendant the Clerk of the
Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department, failed to file the
Notice of Appeal with this Court.

Defendant according filed a
-4-

docketing statement with this Court on March 7, 1990 even though
there was no official appeal before the court.

On April 27, 1990

Defendant's attorney received a letter from a deputy clerk of
this Court informing Defendant that the appeal had not yet been
forwarded from the trial court and that the docketing statement
would be held until May 7, 1990 and thereafter returned if the
appeal was not filed by the Circuit Court Clerk,
to this Brief.

See Appendix

The Notice of Appeal together with the record of

appeal was finally filed with this Court on May 29, 1990 some six
months after the original appeal was instituted by the
defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is undisputed that on Februarly 11, 1989 Defendant was
stopped by Officer Corey Acocks of the West Valley City Police
Department and was given a citation for driving under the
influence of alcohol.

The "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law" of the Circuit Court Judge from which this appeal is taken
does not indicate from what source the "Findings" are derived.
As noted earlier a civil hearing was held before the Department
of Drivers License Division before a hearing officer in
accordance with Utah Administrative Procedure Act 41-2-130.

In

addition, an evidentiary hearing was held before the Circuit
Court at which time Officer Acocks also testified.

Since these

hearings were the only evidentiary base for Findings of Fact they
will both be briefly summarized.
The March 7 hearing before the Department of Drivers'
License Division involved solely the testimony of Officer Corey
-5-

Acocks.

The examination of Officer Acocks was conducted by the

hearing officer.

Acocks stated that he first observed the

defendant's car at 3400 West 3500 South driving eastbound.

The

officer was westbound on 3500 South and observed the vehicle had
no headlights.

This occurred at approximately 11:10 p.m.

The

officer stated he flashed his headlights two separate times but
did not receive a response.

He therefore made a "U" turn and was

stopped for a traffic signal at 3200 West before he caught up
with the vehicle at 2600 West and activated his overhead lights.
The defendant pulled over immediately upon seeing the lights.
(Tr. 5, March 7, 1989 hearing).
At that point Mr. Chapman exited his vehicle and gave the
officer his Utah drivers license.

The Officer thought that Mr.

Chapman may have been a little mentally handicapped since he was
very slow in his responses,.

After checking with the dispatcher

he returned to the vehicle and talked to him through the window
at which time he smelled an odor of alcohol.

(Tr. 6 ) .

The officer stated that he was able to determine that the
odor was coming from in and about the vehicle.

(Tr. 7 ) . Mr.

Chapman upon being asked if he had had anything to drink replied
he had had a couple of drinks a half hour before.

The officer

then asked him if he would take some field sobriety tests and he
agreed to do so. He was given the finger count, leg lift, walk
and turn, ABC f s and NYSTAGMUS tests.

(Id.).

After taking the

field tests the officer arrested Defendant for driving under the
influence.
breath test.

(Tr. 8 ) . Subsequently, he was given a chemical
(Tr. 9-11).
-6-

Upon cross examination the following dialogue occurred:
Q.

MR, LONG: Officer Acocks, you said that when you
first noticed the vehicle, the headlights were off;
is that correct?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

In your police report it says the headlight, as in
singular; which was it?

A.

It was both headlights.

Q.

It was both headlights?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

So, in other words, the lights weren't on?

A.

The headlights weren't on.

Q.

And what about when you caught up to him?

A.

I did not notice that they were on at that time,
either. The taillights, or the brakelights were,
but were dim, I thought that it may be a faulty
equipment problem.
(Tr. 11-12, March 7, 1989) .

The testimony given by the officer in the per se hearing
before the Department of Motor Vehicles was in direct
contradiction to his testimony given at the suppression hearing
before the Circuit Court Judge.

The following dialogue occurred

between the prosecutor and Officer Acocks:

Q.

MR STONEY: Did you do anything as the vehicle
approached in your direction?

A.

Yes, sir, I did.

Q,

And what did you do?

A.

I flashed my headlights off and then back on again
two times.

Q.

And what is that a common signal for?
-7-

To try to get the other driver's attention to turn on
the headlights.
Did the other driver in the vehicle do anything with
his headlights?
The headlights did not come on.
Did the vehicle eventually pass you?
Yes, it did.
Going in the opposite direction?
Yes, sir.
What did you do at that point?
I turned my vehicle around, making a "U" turn, and went
in pursuit of the vehicle.
When you made the "U" turn, could you still see the
vehicle?
Yes, sir.
Had you lost sight of the vehicle at any time, then,
during the "UM turn or before then?
Maybe briefly for a moment (unintelligible), the
vehicle making the turn. I made the turn in safety
for myself and others; but when I turned back around
I noticed that there were no taillights on the
vehicle and still pursued.
You're sure that was the same vehicle?
Yes.
When you say "briefly for a moment" you lost sight of
it when making the turn, were you in the process of
making sure you were making a safe turn?
To make sure no other vehicle was around, I may have
lost sight of the vehicle.
Were there any other vehicles that were able to get
between you and this other, this pickup that you saw?
I don't recall at this time.
Okay, what kind of vehicle was it that you were
-8-

following?
A*
Q.

A Datsun pickup.
You say there were no taillights either at this point?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

How far behind the vehicle were you when you started
following it?

A.

An estimate would probably be, by the time I turned
around, maybe 100 yards.

Q.

Okay.

A.

No.

Q.

You noticed no other violations up to that point?

A.

No sir.

It wasn't speeding (unintelligible) or anything?

(Suppression Hearing, pp. 4-5).
On cross examination again the officer stated there were no
taillights present.
Q.

Didn't you—when you turned around, what attracted
you to the car was that there were no taillights?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you couldn't tell whether the headlights on that
vehicle were on or not?

A.

Not at that point, no, I could not. As I passed
the headlights were off on the vehicle.

Q.

That section of the roadway right there, is almost
like broad daylight at that time of night because
of all the street lights, isn't it?

A.

It's very well lit, uh huh.
(Suppression Hearing, p. 9)

In a later portion of the cross examination the officer stated
the following:
Q.

Now you told me that the taillights were out.
They were totally out of the vehicle you chased,
-9-

is that right?
A-

Yes sir.

Q.

And what about the brake lights?

A.

As the vehicle stopped, I did notice that a dim light
was coming from the taillights.

Q.

Well, let's see, in other words you thought that the
brakes were faulty, the brake lights were faulty?

A.

I don't know at that point what I thought.

Q.

Did you ever follow it up to try to find out, you
know, why the brake lights were so dim?

A.

I did not.

Q.

Did you—when you got up to the vehicle, did you
find out whether the headlights were in fact off?

A.

I don't recall at the point of looking at the
headlights after I made contact with Mr. Chapman.
(Suppression Hearing, pp. 20-21) (Emphasis added).

During the suppression hearing the officer testified that
when Mr. Chapman left his vehicle and approached the officer on
foot that he cooperated with him fully and had no difficulty in
producing his drivers license.

(Suppression Hearing, pp.

11-12), There was no testimony by the officer that he had any
suspicion of Mr. Chapman being intoxicated until the time he
returned to Mr. Chapman's car and smelled alcohol coming from the
vehicle.

(Suppressin Hearing, p. 16).

The Court gave an oral decision denying the motion to
suppress at the conclusion of the suppression hearing.
(Suppression Hearing, pp. 26-27) .

Subsequently, some five months

later the court entered specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law concerning the motion.

-10-

Defendant entered a conditional plea of no contest with the
condition that he could appeal the denial of his Motion to
Suppress.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court's factual finding that the officer had a
reasonable basis to stop Mr, Chapman is not based upon adequate
evidentiary support and the Court's conclusion that a pretext
stop did not occur is erroneous-

The officer's sole basis for

stopping the Chapman vehicle was the alleged failure to have
properly operating headlights and taillights.

As to headlights,

while the officer stated that the lights were out when he passed
the vehicle he could not recall whether they were out at the time
of the stop or whether he even checked to see if they were
operating.

As to taillights his testimony was extremely

contradictory.

In the per se hearing he stated that the

taillights were properly working but that the brake lights were
dim.

In the suppression hearing he stated that the taillights

were out completely and that only the brake lights came on in a
dimmed condition.

The testimony of the officer is simply

insufficient to provide a factual basis for the stop and the
ensuing arrest.
ARGUMENT
THE STOP OF THE DEFENDANT CHAPMAN WAS
NOT JUSTIFIED SINCE THE OFFICER DID
NOT HAVE A REASONABLE BASIS TO SUSPECT
THAT CHAPMAN WAS VIOLATING A TRAFFIC
REGULATION.
In establishing the constitutional standard to stop a
particular automobile, the United States Supreme Court has
-11-

clearly denied an officer the right to randomly stop cars on
public roads.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.

648 (1979).

Utah Supreme Court has also approved this principle.

The

State v.

Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah 1983).
A police officer may, however, stop an automobile for a
traffic violation in the officer's presence.

However, it is

impermissible for law enforcement officers to use a misdemeanor
arrest as a pretext to search for evidence of a more serious
crime. United States v. Millio, 588 F.Supp.

45, 49 (D.N.Y.

1984) .
In determining whether a stop for a traffic violation and
subsequent arrest is a pretext, the totality of the circumstances
governs.

United States v.. Birgnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.

873, 885.

In making this determination the subjective intent of the officer
is irrelevant.

"Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has

occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the officer's
actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him
at the time,' and not on the officer's actual state of mind at
the time the challenged action was taken." Maryland v. Macon, 472
U.S.

463 (1985).
Applying these principles, this Court in State v. Sierra,

754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988) formulated the following standard:
Thus, in determining whether Officer Smith's stop
of Sierra for driving in the left lane was an
unconstitutional pretext, we focus on whether a
hypothetical reasonable officer, in view of the
totality of the circumstances confronting him or her,
would have stopped Sierra to issue a warning for
driving in the left lane. The proper inquiry does not
focus on whether the officer could validly have made
the stop. This analysis is congruent with that
-12-

developed by other jurisdictions under the Fourth
Amendment. 754 P.2d at 978,
This Court approved the reasoning utilized to protect
individuals from pretextual misdemeanor traffic arrests by
quoting a treatise on search and seizure.

This treatise stated:

Given the facts, as noted, that Min most
jurisdictions and for most traffic offenses the
determination of whether to issue a citation or effect
a full arrest is discretionary with the officer," and
that "very few drivers can tranverse any appreciable
distance without violating some traffic regulation,"
this [pretextual traffic stop] is indeed a frightening
possibility. It is apparent that virtually everyone
who ventures out onto the public streets and highways
may then, with little effort by the police, be placed
in a position where he is subject to a full search.
Nor is one put at ease by what evidence exists as to
what police practices in this regard; it is clear that
this subterfuge is employed as a means for searching
for evidence on the persons of suspects who could not
be lawfully arrested for the crimes of which they are
suspected. 754 P.2d at 972 quoting 5 LaFave,
Search and Seizure §5.2(e) 2d. Ed. 1987.
In Sierra this Court held that the stop of defendant's
vehicle was not constitutionally justified as an incident to
citation for a traffic violation for driving unlawfully in the
left lane since a reasonable officer would not have stopped
defendant's car when defendant was in the left lane for 40 to 50
seconds, passing two cars during that time.
Two additional cases decided by this Court are also helpful
to the issue involved in this case.

In State v. Smith, 781

P.2d 879 (Utah App. 1989) a car was stopped by an officer because
it turned into a motel driveway without signaling.

This Court

held that the stop was legal since it was "a clear-cut traffic
violation for which officers routinely stop citizens and issue
citations."
-13-

In State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App.
cert, filed 135 Utah Adv.

Rpt.

1989),

78 (1990) a highway patrol

trooper noticed that the defendant's left-hand signal remained
blinking for two miles after passing a motor home.

This Court in

upholding the stop stated:
In this case, Trooper Avery perceived an equipment
problem with Mr. Marshall's car. Either his turn
signal was malfunctioning or he had negligently failed
to turn it off. Courts consistently have held that a
police officer can stop a car when he or she believes
the car's safety equipment is not functioning
properly. Id. at 882.
Thus, there is no question that under certain circumstances
an officer may legally stop a vehicle for equipment problems
without a claim of a pretext stop being asserted.

In the instant

case, however, the facts do not justify the reasonable
hypothetical officer in pulling over the Chapman vehicle.
The officer testified that he first observed the Chapman
vehicle passing in the opposite direction with no headlights.

He

acknowledged that the street was brightly lit aad did not state
that he considered Mr. Chapman to be driving in any hazardous
manner because of the failure to have his lights on.

In any

event, he proceeded to make a M U" turn and to follow the Chapman
vehicle which he claimed had no taillights showing at the time
the observation was made going in the same direction as the
Chapman vehicle.
Obviously, the officer did not consider the light problem
serious since he stopped at a red light rather than going through
it was he could have under the emergency vehicle provisions of
Utah law.

Assuming that the Chapman vehicle was the same one
-14-

which he initially saw prior to his stop at the intersection he
stated that the taillights were now working prior to the stop
although he considered them to be slightly dim.

After stopping

the vehicle he had no recollection whether the headlights were
working or not.
Defendant would contend that a reasonable hypothetical
officer would conclude that if the taillights were suddenly
turned on that the driver, upon entering a darker section of the
highway, realized he had not activated his lighting system and
therefore had turned on both the headlights and taillights and
that there was no longer a danger present on the road.

Moreover,

a reasonable officer could have passed the Chapman vehicle to
confirm whether the headlights were now operating.
The failure of the officer to even observe whether the
headlights were on or not after the stop raises a serious
question as to his initial motives.

Also, no effort was made to

check the taillights or the brake lights which also allegedly
were a concern of the officer.
It is unlikely that a reasonable hypothetical officer would
have stopped the Chapman vehicle for having momentarily failed to
previously have had its lights on.

The officer himself stated in

the suppression hearing:
Q.

So if you had stopped Mr. Chapman and he hadn't—
there was no evidence he had been drinking, would
you have let him go?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

You wouldn't have given him a citation?

A.

Not for—maybe not for driving with his headlights
-15-

out. I've pulled people over in the past for not
having their headlights on, and they have honestly
just not had them on. And I've done it for safety
reasons.
Q.

So you just give

A.

Yes, sir.

them a warning, then?

(Suppression Hearing, Tr. p. 11).
Defendant submits, therefore, that while the officer may
have initially had a reason to pursue the Chapman vehicle when he
believed that the lights were not on this reason disintegrated
once he approached the vehicle and saw the taillights working and
failed to ascertain whether the headlights were in fact on.

The

testimony is undisputed that there were no other driving
violations occurring nor did the defendant drive in any
unreasonable manner.

Even after he exited his vehicle and gave

the officer his drivers license the officer did not suspect any
alcoholic use.

It was only after the officer approached the

vehicle and could smell the odor of alcohol coming from the
driver's seat that he became suspicious of drinking activity.
The lower court evidently based its opinion upon both the
testimony taken at the per se hearing before the Department of
Motor Vehicles and the testimony before the court at the
suppression hearing.

Elements of both testimonies appear in the

court's Findings of Fact.

The lower court essentially chose to

disregard any contradiction between the two forms of testimony
concerning the taillights even though the per se hearing
testimony indicated that the taillights were on at the time of
the stop while the suppression hearing testmony indicated they

-16-

were never on while the vehicle was being chased.

The court in

its Findings of Fact reconciled this otherwise irreconcileable
testimony by finding that initially the taillights were not on
when the chase began but that they were on at the time the
vehicle was stopped by the officer.

As mentioned earlier, if

this scenario of the facts is utilized then the officer clearly
should have suspected that the driver had now activated his
lighting system and that the headlights were on as well as the
taillights.

If, on the other hand, the taillights were always

out as testified in the suppression hearing then the officer's
testimony in the per se hearing is completely inconsistent.
CONCLUSION
Defendant submits that under the totality of the
circumstances it was unreasonable for Officer Acocks or for any
officer to stop the Chapman vehicle without further investigation
as to the lighting system or, at a minimum, to ascertain the
condition of the lighting system after the stop had actually
occurred.

The complete failure of the officer to even know which

lights were on or off seriously negates any claim for a valid
stop.
For this reason, the lower court erred in denying
Defendant's Motion for Suppression and this Court should reverse
and hold that all evidence acquired subsequent to the stop was
inadmissible.
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will hold your filings until May 7, 1990, and unless an
appeal is received from the trial court by that date, it
will be returned to you.
Sincerely,
y

' /

^

Janice Ray
„ Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

WEST VALLEY CITY,

!

Plaintiff,
VS.

;I

FINDINGS OF FACT

!:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

DALE H. CHAPMAN,
Defendant.

:

AND ORDER

:

NO.

892002005TC

FINDINGS OF FACT
On

February

11, 1989, at approximately 11:30 p.m. Officer

Acocks, while on routine patrol,
eastbound
Acocks

observed

a

vehicle

traveling

on 3500 South at 3400 West with no headlights. Officer

was

approached

traveling
one

westbound

and

as

the

two

vehicles

another from opposite directions, Officer Acocks

flashed his lights as a signal to the vehicle

to

headlights,

After the vehicles

however,

there was no response.

passed one another, Officer Acocks also
lights

were

not

on.

Officer

noticed

Acocks

interrupted

by a stop light.

on

that

initiated

proceeded to follow the vehicle, however, the
was

turn

the

it's

tail

a

U-turn,

Officer's

pursuit

The pursuit continued and the

vehicle was stopped, as the vehicle came to a

stop

the

officer

noticed

dim

or faint tail lights.

At that time, Officer Acocks

did not notice if the headlights were
the

vehicle

did

not

violate

on

any

other

Officer Acocks notice any unususal or
Additionally,

Officer

Acocks

has

the past few months for driving

or

off,

furthermore,

traffic law, nor did

erratic

driving

pattern.

stopped numerous vehicles in

without

headlights

because

of

the traffic hazard.
As Officer Acocks exited
Defendant,

the

his

vehicle

Defendant's

slow.
for

balance

was

identification

and

unsteady

both

vehicles.

Officer Acocks then

and

the

Acocks

The officer

could

Defendnat
smell

returned
approached

rolled

an

odor

Acocks

down

of

Officer

drinking.

The Defendant responded, "had a

The

Defnedant

Based

upon

the

consented

to

their

the

alcohol

asked

noticed

driver's

to

his

vehicle.

ago".

the

that

and that his speech was

Officer Acocks obtained the Defendant's

when

approached

Defendant Dale H. Chapman exited his vehicle and

began walking towards Officer Acocks.
the

and

license

respective

Defendant

again

car window, Officer
emanating

Defendnat
couple

performing

from

the

if he had been
a

half

hour

field sobriety

tests.
observing

the

headlights and tail lights, odor of
statement

vehicle
alcohol,

operating
unsteady

without
balance,

of drinking alcohol, and poor performance on the field

sobriety tests, Officer Acocks placed the Defendant under
for

Driving

Under

the

Influence

of

Alcohol

arrest

in violation of

41-6-44 of the Revised Ordinances of West Valley City.
The

Defendant

moves

this

Court for an order Suppressing

evidence obtained by Officer Acocks based upon the grounds
Officer

Acocks1

stop

of

the

Defendant

was

that,

not based upon a

reasonable articulable suspicion in violation of the

Defendant's

Fourth Amendment Rights.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Officer Acocks' observation of the Defendant's vehicle

operating without headlights and dim tail lights is a
articulable

suspicion,

reasonable

not a mere hunch, that the Defendant was

violating the law by creating a traffic hazard.
2.

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, and totality

of the circumstances, Officer Acocks' stop of the
a

traffic

violation

committed

reasonable and one which

a

in

the

reasonable

Defendant

for

officer's presence was

officer

would

perform.

Therefore, the stop was not a pretext.
3.

Statements made by the Defendant to

investigatory
interogation.

in

nature

and

do

not

the

amount

officer,
to

were

custodial

ORDER

Based

upon

the

Defendant
DATED this

foregoing,

IT

_

HEREBY

-RDERED

.*;i£cULiec
•

,-,

vembey, ^ 8 9 J ^

' '

TYRON?^.- MEDLEY"

Thir'i, C i r c u i t Court Jud-£

A

that

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I

hereby

certify that I delivered a tru€i and correct copy

of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
to

Order

L. Long, Attorney for Defendant, and Paula Houston, Assistant

City Prosecutor.
DATED this 29th day of November, 1989.

